Rebuilding Teams Would Swell Under Bush's New Iraq Plan - New York Times
The New York Times

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January 15, 2007
Rebuilding Teams Would Swell Under Bush's New Iraq Plan
By
JAMES GLANZ

BAGHDAD, Jan. 14 - As part of its latest plan to stabilize
Iraq
, the United States intends to more than double the number of regional
reconstruction teams and to add nearly 400 specialists for existing and new
teams,
in fields from politics and the rule of law to agribusiness and veterinary
care, according to an official outline of the plan.

The document calls for the measures to be taken swiftly, in three phases,
with waves of new teams and personnel expected to be put in place in March,
June
and September. The teams are to carry out rebuilding and governance projects
from small offices all over Iraq.

The document, provided to The New York Times by a critic of the plan, lays
out what an American official familiar with its contents calls simply "the
playbook,"
giving detailed estimates of the costs to be incurred by various teams as a
result of the changes. About $250,000, for example, is set aside for new
office
furnishings for a team in the southern city of Basra, which is supposed to
receive 25 additional specialists.

While the plan does call for the creation of about a dozen new
reconstruction teams around Iraq, most of the new personnel will be added to
existing teams,
the plan indicates. While 400 may sound like a small number compared with
the plan to increase the number of troops by more than 20,000, the existing
10
reconstruction teams have, at most, a total of about 100 civilian
specialists, and recruiting that many has been difficult, officials say.

Whether it is wise to increase the staffing of the teams by a factor of five
is likely to be questioned by existing team members, the American official
said.

That is because extremely restrictive security regulations have made it
difficult for the specialists already on the provincial reconstruction
teams, often
called P.R.T.'s, to leave their bases and work with Iraqis, the official
said, adding that the cumbersome rules must be followed even in relatively
safe
areas in the northern and central parts of Iraq. "Across the board they have
to follow the same security rules," the official said. "So the P.R.T.'s that
could be successful still can't get out in the field."

In addition, because oversight agencies have previously reported that the
existing teams have had trouble equipping themselves with items as essential
as
pencils and other office supplies, a fresh wave of officials could find it
more difficult than expected to begin their work for reasons other than
security.

The teams also have been criticized for relying heavily on uniformed
personnel whose skills are poorly matched with specialized needs in the
field. That
concern has repeatedly come up because the State Department has had great
difficulty persuading civilian officials to accept jobs at the dangerous,
isolated
and uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.

The document does not explain how so many additional government officials
with the specialized skills called for will be recruited when the State
Department
has found it so difficult to bring a much smaller number to Iraq in the
past.

United States officials have previously disclosed elements of the plans
outlined in the document, which is dated Jan. 14. Among those elements are
the request
for $414 million in additional State Department financing for 2007 and the
likely need to search for officials with a range of technical specialties to
accept the jobs.

But the new document makes clear that detailed plans have progressed far
beyond those numbers. There are indications that the United States plans to
add
six teams in Baghdad, apparently scattered around the city, and three in
western Anbar Province. Each has one team now.

Together, Anbar and Baghdad account for more than 140 of the projected
additional specialists. They are to include political advisers, economics
experts,
medical personnel and specialists in city management, engineering and
business.

The other new personnel are to be scattered around the country; for
instance, the little office in Diyala Province, now staffed with no more
than a handful
of Americans, would receive 33 more. For perspective, an entire American
Embassy in a small country might have fewer American officials than the
number
planned for Diyala Province.

A summary at the beginning of the document indicates that beyond their
purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to support the
counterinsurgency
efforts by the United States military. There is no description of how that
support would be carried out.

Nonmilitary duties relegated to the teams, according to the document, would
be to promote moderate political groups and to further reconciliation in
Iraqi
society.

They would also be asked to help by "fostering economic development" and
"building capacity" at the provincial level. "Capacity" is a bureaucratic
term
meaning skill in technical, managerial and other areas.

Some of the projected costs may raise eyebrows. Around the country, for
example, the United States plans to spend more than $2 million in office
furnishings
alone as part of the plan. More than $7 million is budgeted for information
technology, apparently including computers. Some of that money may be used
to support existing team members.

The new plans could become a windfall for more than computer and furniture
companies.

The document's last page gives a hint of the likely financing requests in
support of the teams in fiscal year 2008, suggesting that protection alone
may
require $400 million.

Copyright 2007
The New York Times Company

Posted by Miriam V.