Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq - New York Times
The New York Times

May 1, 2006
Op-Ed Contributors

Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq
By JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. and LESLIE H. GELB

A decade ago, Bosnia was torn apart by ethnic cleansing and facing its
demise as a single country. After much hesitation, the United States stepped
in decisively
with the Dayton Accords,which kept the country whole by, paradoxically,
dividing it into ethnic federations, even allowing Muslims, Croats and Serbs
to
retain separate armies. With the help of American and other forces, Bosnians
have lived a decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their
common central government, including disbanding those separate armies last
year.

Now the Bush administration, despite its profound strategic misjudgments in
Iraq, has a similar opportunity. To seize it, however, America must get
beyond
the present false choice between "staying the course" and "bringing the
troops home now" and choose a third way that would wind down our military
presence
responsibly while preventing chaos and preserving our key security goals.

The idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by decentralizing it,
giving each ethno-religious group - Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab - room
to
run its own affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of
common interests. We could drive this in place with irresistible sweeteners
for
the Sunnis to join in, a plan designed by the military for withdrawing and
redeploying American forces, and a regional nonaggression pact.

It is increasingly clear that President Bush does not have a strategy for
victory in Iraq. Rather, he hopes to prevent defeat and pass the problem
along
to his successor. Meanwhile, the frustration of Americans is mounting so
fast that Congress might end up mandating a rapid pullout, even at the risk
of
precipitating chaos and a civil war that becomes a regional war.

As long as American troops are in Iraq in significant numbers, the
insurgents can't win and we can't lose. But intercommunal violence has
surpassed the
insurgency as the main security threat. Militias rule swathes of Iraq and
death squads kill dozens daily. Sectarian cleansing has recently forced tens
of thousands from their homes. On top of this, President Bush did not
request additional reconstruction assistance and is slashing funds for
groups promoting
democracy.

Iraq's new government of national unity will not stop the deterioration.
Iraqis have had three such governments in the last three years, each with
Sunnis
in key posts, without noticeable effect. The alternative path out of this
terrible trap has five elements.

The first is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable
central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions would
each
be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal
security. The central government would control border defense, foreign
affairs
and oil revenues. Baghdad would become a federal zone, while densely
populated areas of mixed populations would receive both multisectarian and
international
police protection.

Decentralization is hardly as radical as it may seem: the Iraqi
Constitution, in fact, already provides for a federal structure and a
procedure for provinces
to combine into regional governments.

Besides, things are already heading toward partition: increasingly, each
community supports federalism, if only as a last resort. The Sunnis, who
until
recently believed they would retake power in Iraq, are beginning to
recognize that they won't and don't want to live in a Shiite-controlled,
highly centralized
state with laws enforced by sectarian militias. The Shiites know they can
dominate the government, but they can't defeat a Sunni insurrection. The
Kurds
will not give up their 15-year-old autonomy.

Some will say moving toward strong regionalism would ignite sectarian
cleansing. But that's exactly what is going on already, in ever-bigger
waves. Others
will argue that it would lead to partition. But a breakup is already under
way. As it was in Bosnia, a strong federal system is a viable means to
prevent
both perils in Iraq.

The second element would be to entice the Sunnis into joining the federal
system with an offer they couldn't refuse. To begin with, running their own
region
should be far preferable to the alternatives: being dominated by Kurds and
Shiites in a central government or being the main victims of a civil war.
But
they also have to be given money to make their oil-poor region viable. The
Constitution must be amended to guarantee Sunni areas 20 percent
(approximately
their proportion of the population) of all revenues.

The third component would be to ensure the protection of the rights of women
and ethno-religious minorities by increasing American aid to Iraq but tying
it to respect for those rights. Such protections will be difficult,
especially in the Shiite-controlled south, but Washington has to be clear
that widespread
violations will stop the cash flow.

Fourth, the president must direct the military to design a plan for
withdrawing and redeploying our troops from Iraq by 2008 (while providing
for a small
but effective residual force to combat terrorists and keep the neighbors
honest). We must avoid a precipitous withdrawal that would lead to a
national
meltdown , but we also can't have a substantial long-term American military
presence. That would do terrible damage to our armed forces, break American
and Iraqi public support for the mission and leave Iraqis without any
incentive to shape up.

Fifth, under an international or United Nations umbrella, we should convene
a regional conference to pledge respect for Iraq's borders and its federal
system.
For all that Iraq's neighbors might gain by picking at its pieces, each
faces the greater danger of a regional war. A "contact group" of major
powers would
be set up to lean on neighbors to comply with the deal.

Mr. Bush has spent three years in a futile effort to establish a strong
central government in Baghdad, leaving us without a real political
settlement, with
a deteriorating security situation - and with nothing but the most difficult
policy choices. The five-point alternative plan offers a plausible path to
that core political settlement among Iraqis, along with the economic,
military and diplomatic levers to make the political solution work. It is
also a
plausible way for Democrats and Republicans alike to protect our basic
security interests and honor our country's sacrifices.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, is the ranking member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Leslie H. Gelb is the president emeritus
of
the Council on Foreign Relations.

Posted vy Miriam V.